Meet-and-Confer Requirement Does Not Apply to Pension Reform Measure Placed on Ballot through Voter Initiative Process

April 2017
Number 20

In Boling v. Public Employment Relations Board (Apr. 11, 2017, D069626) ___ Cal.App.4th ___ (Boling), the Fourth District Court of Appeal invalidated a decision by the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB) holding that a city council violated the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA) by placing a voter initiative to amend the city’s charter on the ballot without first meeting and conferring with the unions representing affected city employees. In doing so, the court rejected PERB’s reasoning that the mayor’s public support of the initiative effectively transformed it from a voter initiative to a city council-sponsored ballot proposal subject to meet-and-confer requirements.

This case addresses a longstanding issue. In a 1984 case, People ex rel. Seal Beach Police Officers Assn. v City of Seal Beach, the California Supreme Court concluded that a charter amendment proposed by a governing body is subject to the MMBA’s requirements, but cautioned that the case did “not involve the question whether the meet-and-confer requirement was intended to apply to charter amendments proposed by initiative.” Three decades after Seal Beach, a California appellate court has addressed that question for the first time.

The Boling case traces back to a City of San Diego decision on an issue that rarely evades controversy: public employee pension plans. In 2010, the city’s mayor and a city councilmember separately announced plans to replace the city’s existing defined benefit pension plans with 401(k)-style defined contribution plans for new hires. Ultimately, supporters of the mayor’s proposal and of the city councilmember’s competing proposal joined forces to produce an initiative to adopt a charter amendment mandating changes to pension plans for new hires.

The California Constitution provides two options for proposing an amendment to a city charter: an initiative qualified for the ballot through signed voter petitions, or a ballot measure sponsored by the governing body of the city. Rather than pursuing a ballot measure sponsored by the San Diego City Council (City Council), which the mayor believed the City Council would not place on the ballot “under any circumstances,” he launched a citizens’ initiative for his pension reform proposal. The parties to the case never disputed the fact that the mayor and his staff assisted in drafting the proposal and in campaigning for the citizens’ initiative.

In the summer of 2011, proponents of the proposal circulated a voter petition to place the initiative on the ballot. Meanwhile, a municipal employees’ union wrote to the mayor and asserted that the MMBA required the city to meet and confer over the initiative before it could be placed on the ballot. The city disagreed and refused to do so. In November 2011, the county’s registrar of voters reviewed and certified the petition. Subsequently, the City Council passed a resolution of its intention to put the measure on the ballot.

In January 2012, the union filed an unfair practice charge. Other unions followed suit. Later that month, the City Council enacted an ordinance placing the initiative on the June 2012 ballot. Shortly thereafter, PERB issued a complaint against the city and ordered an expedited administrative hearing. PERB also filed a superior court action seeking a preliminary injunction to bar the city from putting the initiative on the ballot. The trial court denied PERB’s request for an injunction and the voters overwhelmingly approved the initiative in June 2012.

However, the proceedings before PERB continued and the case went to a hearing in July 2012. At the conclusion of the PERB hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ) issued a proposed decision determining that the mayor, acting under the color of his elected office and with support of councilmembers and the city attorney, violated the MMBA by denying the unions the opportunity to meet and confer over the mayor’s decision to launch and pursue the initiative. The ALJ further determined that since the mayor was an agent of the city, and because the city ratified the mayor’s policy decision, the obligation to meet and confer extended to the city. PERB agreed and issued a decision consistent with the ALJ’s proposed decision.

The city and the initiative’s proponents filed separate petitions for writs of extraordinary relief with the Fourth District Court of Appeal challenging PERB’s decision, which the Court of Appeal consolidated for purposes of its decision.

The Court of Appeal disagreed with PERB’s conclusions and determined that the MMBA’s meet-and-confer requirement does not apply when a proposed charter amendment is placed on the ballot by citizen proponents through the initiative process. Instead, only a governing body-sponsored proposal willtrigger the meet-and-confer requirement.

Central to the court’s analysis was the principle that procedural requirements that govern city council action generally do not apply to citizen-sponsored initiatives. Unlike a charter amendment proposed by a city council, a voter-initiated charter amendment proposal must be placed on the ballot; the city council has no discretion to decide otherwise. (Elec. Code, § 9255.) In contrast, a city council’s vote to adopt a ballot proposal for submission to its voters is discretionary and is thus subject to certain procedural constraints, including the requirement to negotiate. Moreover, the court reasoned, the MMBA’s meet-and-confer provisions expressly refer to “governing body” proposals, which a voter initiative is not.

The court further determined that PERB erred when it applied legal theories regarding principal-agent relationships to transform the initiative from a citizen-sponsored initiative into a governing body-sponsored ballot proposal, even given the mayor’s role in developing and supporting the initiative. This was in part because under the express language of the city’s charter, the mayor had no authority to place a City Council-sponsored ballot proposal on the ballot without City Council approval, and there were no indicators that he obtained such approval. The court also rejected PERB’s arguments under the theories of apparent authority, respondeat superior, and ratification as legally erroneous.

This case resolves a major question regarding the balance of power between voter-driven initiatives and union collective bargaining rights, with the court deciding the issue in favor of the electoral process.

For more information on the Boling decision or a local government agency’s collective bargaining duties, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of ournine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

Steven A. Nunes


©2017 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

California Public Records Act Applies to Private Accounts

March 2017
Number 11

Emails, text messages and other written communications sent to or from a public official’s private account may be subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), the California Supreme Court ruled unanimously in a highly anticipated decision published on March 2, 2017. (City of San Jose et al. v. Superior Court (March 2, 2017, No. S218066) ___ Cal.5th ___ <>.)

The court held that the public has a right under the CPRA to access texts, emails and other records discussing public business regardless of whether the records were created, received by or stored in a private account. “If public officials could evade the law simply by clicking into a different email account, or communicating through a personal device,” the court wrote, “sensitive information could routinely evade public scrutiny.”

This case had its origin in a 2009 lawsuit against the City of San Jose, its redevelopment agency and several city officials. The plaintiff in that case, a community activist, claimed that the city’s failure to provide certain records regarding a downtown redevelopment project and other city business violated the CPRA. The city had provided certain records, but declined to provide voicemails, emails and text messages that were sent and received by city officials on personal devices using personal accounts. In 2013, a trial court judge ruled against the city, finding that communications sent to or received from city officials regarding public business are public records regardless of what device or account was used to create and deliver them. ( See 2013 Client News Brief No. 17.)

The city appealed the decision, and in 2014, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed the decision. The appellate court ruled that the CPRA’s definition of public records as communications “prepared, owned, used, or retained” by a public agency did not include messages sent or received on individual city officials’ and employees’ private devices and accounts. ( See 2014 Client News Brief No. 21.) Distinguishing between a public agency as the holder of public documents and its individual elected officials and employees, the appellate court held that, as a practical matter, the city could not use or retain a message sent from an individual council member’s phone that was not linked to a city server or account. While acknowledging the potential for abuses, the court determined that it is up to the Legislature to decide whether to require public agencies to police officials’ private devices and accounts.

The community activist then appealed to the California Supreme Court, where the case languished for nearly three years before the high court overturned the appellate decision.

In its ruling, the Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court because records “prepared” on private devices could still qualify as public records. The high court observed that the agency itself is not a person who can create, send and save communications; rather, any such communication would come from or be received by an individual. As such, the city’s elected officials and employees were in essence acting as the city, and to the extent that their emails pertained to city business, they were public records.

The court did narrow the type of records that are subject to disclosure, holding that records containing conversations that are primarily personal in nature are not subject to disclosure under the CPRA. The court also acknowledged that determining whether particular communications constitute public records is a heavily fact-specific process, and decisions must be made on a case-by-case basis. This will create challenges for public agencies as they attempt to follow the reasoning of this decision.

The court also addressed the practical challenges around retrieving records from personal accounts, including ways to limit the potential for invading personal privacy. For guidance, the court offered examples of methods for retrieving records from personal accounts including procedures adopted by federal courts applying the Freedom of Information Act and followed by the Washington Supreme Court under that state’s records law that allow individuals to search their own devices for responsive records when a request is received and to submit an affidavit regarding potentially responsive documents that are withheld. The court also discussed adoption of policies that would prohibit the use of personal accounts for public business, unless messages are copied and forwarded to an official government account. While these methods were offered as examples, the court did not endorse any specific approach.

The opinion did not address a host of other practical issues, such as how public agencies should proceed when employees refuse or fail to provide access to records contained in their private accounts.

The decision means that public agencies must now carefully consider how to retrieve business-related public records that may be located in employees’ and officials’ personal accounts. One approach is to create new policies that address the decision. However, public agencies should consider the implications such policies may have on issues such as collective bargaining, records retention, acceptable use policies and other policies concerning technology.

Lozano Smith attorneys can provide a wide array of CPRA services, including preparing policies to address this opinion, responding to CPRA requests, analyzing documents and assisting in related litigation. Lozano Smith has a model email retention policy, and is in the process of reviewing and updating this and other model policies to reflect the impact of this decision. In order to receive our existing retention policy, which addresses individual employees’ obligations in relation to electronic communications, or to request our upcoming board policy to address the court’s decision, you may also email Harold Freiman at or Manuel Martinez at We will also be producing webinars about the City of San Jose case and electronic records under the CPRA.

For more information on the City of San Jose opinion or about the California Public Records Act application to personal technology in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

©2017 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Change in Law May Require Shift to Even-Year Elections

February 2017
Number 8

In September 2015, Governor Jerry Brown signed into law Senate Bill (SB) 415. SB 415, which becomes operative on January 1, 2018, prohibits political subdivisions from holding odd-year regular elections if a prior odd-year election resulted in a “significant decrease in voter turnout,” as defined by statute. The new law reflects a policy of encouraging election consolidations to defray election costs and encourage voter participation. It applies only to regular elections and not to special elections.

Specifically, the new law, which is codified at Elections Code sections 14050 et seq., provides that a political subdivision (such as a city, school district, community college district or other district organized pursuant to state law) shall not hold an election other than on a statewide election date if holding an election on a “nonconcurrent date” has previously resulted in a “significant decrease in voter turnout.” “Nonconcurrent dates” are non-statewide election dates such as odd-year board member elections (or “off-cycle” election dates). A “significant decrease in voter turnout” is a voter turnout in a regular election in a political subdivision that is at least 25 percent less than the average voter turnout within that political subdivision for the previous four statewide general elections.

If a political subdivision has experienced such a “significant decrease in voter turnout” and is prohibited from holding future off-cycle elections, it may still hold off-cycle elections through 2021 if, by January 1, 2018, it has adopted a plan to consolidate a future election with a statewide election not later than the November 8, 2022 statewide general election.

In determining when to make the transition, political subdivisions should build in an administrative time buffer. In order to consolidate a currently-scheduled election into a general election, cities will need to enact an ordinance and seek approval from their county board of supervisors, among other requirements. Likewise, certain other categories of political subdivisions that wish to consolidate a currently-scheduled legislative body member election will need to adopt a resolution, seek approval from their county board of supervisors and comply with other statutory preconditions. Elections Code sections 10404 and 10404.5 provide that such a resolution must be adopted and submitted for approval no later than 240 days prior to the date of the currently-scheduled election. For an election scheduled in November 2017, the deadline for such actions would be March 13, 2017.

Political subdivisions should also consider the short-term effects of the transition. School districts, for example, which may now be able to hold Proposition 39 bond measure elections on an annual basis, will be limited to holding such elections once every two years once they transition to even-year election cycles. Political subdivisions should also be aware that consolidating elections to move them from odd to even years may affect the duration of their officers’ or board members’ terms. Consolidating school board elections, for example, will result in extending terms for current board members by one year.

A political subdivision that holds an odd-year election after January 1, 2018 without first adopting a transition plan can be sued by a voter within the political subdivision and compelled to comply with SB 415. If the voter prevails, the political subdivision will be liable for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Lozano Smith has assisted political subdivisions with applying the 25 percent rule of SB 415 and with the mechanics of transitioning to even-year election cycles. If you have questions about compliance with SB 415 or any other issues impacting school districts and other local government entities, please contact an attorney at one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

Steven Nunes


©2017 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

County Boards of Education May Not Exempt Charter Schools from Local Zoning Regulations

February 2017
Number 7

A California Court of Appeal has held that a county board of education may not grant exemptions from zoning ordinances under Government Code section 53094. ( San Jose Unified School District v. Santa Clara County Office of
(Jan 24, 2017, No. H041088) ___ Cal.App.5th ___ < http://www.courts. >.) Specifically, county boards may not exempt the charter schools they authorize from zoning ordinances. School districts have this power; county boards do not.

The Santa Clara County Office of Education granted Rocketship Education (“Rocketship”) a countywide charter to operate up to 25 charter elementary schools within the county. Rocketship proposed to locate one of its elementary schools on property that was owned by the City of San Jose (“City”) and not zoned for school use. The proposed property was located within the jurisdiction of the San Jose Unified School District (“District”), but was zoned only for open space, parklands and habitat. Because the City’s General Plan prohibited operating a school on the property, the Santa Clara County Board of Education granted Rocketship an exemption to the City’s zoning ordinance under Government Code section 53094.

Under the language of Government Code section 53094, subdivision (b), only the “governing board of a school district” may grant zoning exemptions. The San Jose Unified School District and a local property owner filed separate petitions for writs of mandate seeking to invalidate the exemption. They argued that county boards of education are not school district governing boards, and lack authority to exempt property from local zoning laws. The trial court granted the District’s writ petition and ordered the County Office of Education to rescind Rocketship’s zoning exemption – thus leaving Rocketship without a school site.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision. In reaching its conclusion, the appellate court relied on the legislative history of section 53094, which was enacted in response to the decisions inHall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177 andTown of Atherton v. Superior Court (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d 417.Hall and Atherton generally held that school districts engage in sovereign activities of the state when they design and construct school facilities, and therefore are not required to comply with local zoning ordinances in designating school locations. These cases, however, unwittingly immunized a large number of state agencies from local regulation, and section 53094 was passed to narrow this exemption authority specifically to local school districts.

The court noted that, although county offices of education have authority to grant charter petitions and oversee charter schools, it is local school districts that are obligated to provide charter school facilities under Proposition 39 (Ed. Code, § 47614, subd. (b).) Because a county office of education does not bear responsibility to acquire sites for charter schools, it does not perform a sovereign activity on behalf of the state if it chooses to do so. This is because the state has tasked districts, not county offices of education, with such responsibility. Therefore, empowering county boards of education to issue zoning exemptions would not advance section 53094’s purpose – namely, preventing local interference with the state’s sovereign activities.

While each charter school’s situation is unique, this decision will likely impact the siting of county-authorized charter schools and require increased collaboration between government entities when zoning serves as an impediment to locating a charter school facility.

For more information on the San Jose Unified School District opinion or the Charter Schools Act, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney in Lozano Smith’s Charter School Practice Group or at one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website , follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

Edward Sklar


Erin Hamor


©2017 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Attorney Invoices are Subject to Disclosure under the Public Records Act

January 2017
Number 3

The California Supreme Court has ruled that invoices from a public agency’s legal counsel are subject to disclosure under the California Public Records Act (CPRA), with limited exceptions. Invoices for work in pending and active legal matters may generally be shielded from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege.

In Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court (Dec. 29, 2016, No. S226645) ___ Cal.4th___ < S226645A.PDF >, the court considered to what extent invoices from a public entity’s attorney are subject to disclosure under the CPRA.

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) suspected attorneys for the Los Angeles County jail system of wasting public funds by engaging in “scorched earth” litigation tactics. The ACLU submitted a CPRA request to Los Angeles County (County) seeking invoices indicating amounts billed in connection with nine different lawsuits in order to determine whether the county engaged in wasteful legal strategies. The county agreed to produce invoices relating to three lawsuits that were no longer pending, with attorney-client privileged information redacted, but declined to produce invoices for the six remaining lawsuits that remained pending, claiming the attorney-client privilege protected them from disclosure.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the attorney-client privilege generally protects attorney invoices from disclosure if the invoices were maintained in a privileged manner.

In a close 4-3 ruling, a divided Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s decision, balancing competing rights and privileges in its majority opinion. While the CPRA provides the public with a broad right of access to records in the possession of state and local government agencies, it also contains a number of exceptions that protect certain categories of documents from disclosure, including documents protected by the attorney-client privilege.

In analyzing whether attorney invoices are categorically protected by the attorney-client privilege, the Supreme Court adhered to the principle that “the heartland of the privilege protects those communications that bear some relationship to the attorney’s provision of legal consultation.” The court explained that the attorney-client privilege does not extend toall communications between an attorney and client, but rather “to communications that bear some relationship to the provision of legal consultation.” The court concluded that the primary purpose of invoices is for the attorney to receive payment, and not “for the purpose of legal consultation.” In other words, invoices may not be withheld simply because they are sent from an attorney. Whether an invoice or specific information in the invoice can be withheld is a fact-specific inquiry into whether the invoice as a whole, or certain information contained in it, bears a relationship to the provision of legal consultation.

The court concluded that information in an invoice “to inform the client of the nature or amount of work occurringin connection with a pending legal issue” is protected by the attorney-client privilege. The amount of fees being expended on a pending and active legal matter is also privileged, because changes in spending could indirectly reveal legal strategy to a party that can use that information to the detriment of the government agency. However, fee information for concluded legal matters may not be subject to the privilege because, over time, the information “no longer provides any insight into litigation strategy or legal consultation.” While the fee information contained in such an invoice may not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, the court’s opinion appears to allow redaction of specific information in the invoice that may reveal information about legal consultation, though the court was not that express about this point.

The takeaways from this case can be summarized as follows:

  • Legal invoices for concluded matters are disclosable, subject to any lawfully allowed redactions of information that reveals attorney-client confidences; and
  • Legal invoices for pending or active matters can be withheld in their entirety.

Lozano Smith strives to provide invoices that have sufficient information for audit purposes and to keep clients informed. However, we are conscious of our clients’ obligations under the CPRA and endeavor to avoid including information in invoices that could reveal attorney-client privileged advice or strategy.

For more information on this case or the California Public Records Act in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App .
Written by:

Nicholas J. Clair


©2016 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Proposition 64: Legal and Practical Considerations

December 2016
Number 87

On November 8, 2016, California voters passed the “Control, Regulation and Tax Adult Use of Marijuana Act” (“Prop. 64”), legalizing recreational marijuana use for those 21 years old and older. The new law, effective immediately, among many other provisions does the following related to marijuana:

  • Establishes a regulatory scheme for cultivation, distribution, sale, testing and use;
  • Allows for personal cultivation of up to six plants inside a private home;
  • Prohibits public use;
  • Prohibits all use in vehicles and maintains existing laws about driving while impaired;
  • Prohibits use within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center or youth center (unless it is in a private residence within that radius and the smoke cannot be detected at the school or center);
  • Allows cities and counties significant local control over regulation related to sale, manufacturing, production, cultivation and related businesses, including the authority to ban certain activities within the agency’s jurisdiction;
  • Allows public and private employers to prohibit use, possession, purchasing, transporting, obtaining or giving away marijuana on their premises and to establish and enforce drug- and alcohol-free workplace policies;
  • Imposes penalties for public use, use in prohibited school or tobacco-free zones or for having an open container; and
  • Provides for drug prevention education and community service for offenders younger than 18 years.

The Act also establishes the Bureau of Marijuana Control, a division within the Department of Consumer Affairs, which will oversee the licensing, regulation and taxation of all marijuana businesses beginning January 1, 2018. Thus, provisions related to licensing and taxation are not effective until January 1, 2018. However, the provisions allowing personal use and cultivation of marijuana inside a private residence are effective immediately.

The impact of federal law on enforcement of Prop. 64 is uncertain. Marijuana continues to be a Class 1 narcotic under the federal Controlled Substances Act, but the U.S. Department of Justice indicated in a 2013 memorandum that it would defer enforcement for marijuana violations to states that had established “strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems.” It is uncertain whether the Department of Justice’s current practice will remain in effect or be altered when a new presidential administration takes office in January.

The passage of Prop. 64 raises many issues for public agencies responsible for school and child safety, public health and safety, law enforcement, and for maintaining safe and drug-free workplaces. These issues include, but are not limited to:

  • Employees possessing, using or sharing marijuana in or near the workplace;
  • Establishing a defensible drug-free workplace policy, including a drug-testing protocol; and
  • Dealing with employees and/or students who are suspected of being under the influence.

Lozano Smith is currently working with our municipal, school district, community college and special district clients to address these and other issues related to the enactment of Prop. 64. For more information on how the new law impacts your agency, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit ourwebsite, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

Lee Burdick

Senior Counsel

©2016 Lozano Smith
As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Labor and Employment Legislative Update, Part Two

December 2016
Number 86

Governor Jerry Brown considered several bills this legislative season that will affect the rights of public employees and their employers. In this second part of a two-part series, Lozano Smith summarizes seven new laws with the greatest potential impact on public employers in 2017.

Assembly Bill (AB) 2248: Expedited Authorizations for Out-of-State Teachers with Bilingual Authorization

AB 2248 seeks to address California’s teacher shortage and expedite the ability of schools to place qualified bilingual teachers (i.e., teachers authorized to deliver content instruction in a pupil’s primary language) in California classrooms. Under existing law, teachers who hold an out-of-state credential authorizing instruction of English learners are allowed to earn an English learner authorization to teach in California. However, current law does not extend that authorization to out-of-state bilingual teachers. Instead, out-of-state bilingual teachers must take professional tests and coursework to obtain a bilingual authorization in California regardless of their qualifications. AB 2248 amends Education Code section 44253.4 so that a teacher who holds an out-of-state bilingual authorization can earn an equivalent bilingual learner authorization in California by simply submitting an application and a fee.

Senate Bill (SB) 1001: New Prohibitions on Employer Review of Employment Authorization Documents

On September 28, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 1001 into law. SB 1001 adds section 1019.1 to the Labor Code, which will prohibit employers from engaging in certain practices when reviewing employment authorization documents in order to verify, as required by federal law, whether an individual is authorized to work in the United States. Pursuant to SB 1001, an employer is prohibited from: (1) requesting more or different work authorization documents than are required under federal law; (2) refusing to honor documents that on their face reasonably appear to be genuine; (3) refusing to honor documents or work authorization based upon the specific status that accompanies the authorization to work; and (4) attempting to re-investigate or re-verify an incumbent employee’s authorization to work using an unfair immigration-related practice. The new code section also provides for sanctions against employers who violate its provisions, including monetary penalties imposed by the state Labor Commissioner of up to $10,000 per violation. In addition, job applicants and employees can bring a complaint with the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement to address violations of this new law. Employers should be mindful of these new prohibitions when reviewing employment authorization records to ensure compliance with the law.

SB 1180: Additional Leave Rights for Military Veterans

On September 28, 2016, Governor Brown signed SB 1180 into law. The bill, which adds sections 44978.2 and 45191.5 to the Education Code, is intended to provide disabled veterans who are new school employees with additional leave benefits during their first year of employment. Pursuant to SB 1180, certificated and classified employees hired on or after January 1, 2017 who are military veterans with a military service-connected disability rated at 30 percent or more by the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs are entitled to a leave of absence for illness or injury with pay of up to 10 days (certificated) or 12 days (classified) during their first year of employment for the purpose of undergoing medical treatment for their military service-connected disability. This new leave is in addition to other leave already provided by existing law.

AB 1676 and SB 1063: Amendments to California’s Fair Pay Act

Existing law prohibits an employer from paying any employee “at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of the opposite sex for substantially similar work, when viewed as a composite of skill, effort, and responsibility, and performed under similar working conditions.” Willfully doing so is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $10,000 and/or six months imprisonment. (Lab. Code, §§ 1197.5, 1199.5.) The law contains specific exceptions, including where the pay differential is based on (1) a seniority system, (2) a merit system, (3) a system that measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or (4) a bona fide factor other than sex, such as education, training, or experience. These factors must be reasonably applied and account for the entire wage differential. (Lab. Code, § 1197.5.)

AB 1676 amends Labor Code section 1197.5 to provide that an employee’s “prior salary,” by itself, is not sufficient to justify any disparity in compensation. That is, an employer who relies solely on the employee’s prior salary to explain a pay differential will not qualify for the “bona fide” factor exception.

SB 1063 amends Labor Code sections 1197.5 and 1199.5 so that in addition to pay differentials based on sex, employers are prohibited from paying employees “at wage rates less than the rates paid to employees of another race or ethnicity.” Willfully paying employees less based on race and ethnicity is a misdemeanor. Local agencies and school districts are not entitled to reimbursement from the state for any costs they may incur as a result of SB 1063.

AB 1843: Juvenile Record Off Limits in Employment Decisions

With some exceptions, under existing law set forth in Labor Code section 432.7, when making employment decisions, an employer cannot inquire about or consider information concerning an arrest or detention that did not result in a conviction, a referral to or participation in any pretrial or post-trial diversion program or a conviction that has been judicially dismissed or ordered sealed. AB 1843 amends Labor Code section 432.7 to prohibit employers from asking a job applicant to disclose, or from utilizing as a factor in determining any condition of employment, information concerning or related to an arrest, detention, processing, diversion, supervision, adjudication or court disposition that occurred while the person was subject to the process and jurisdiction of juvenile court law. In addition, the definition of “conviction” in Labor Code section 432.7 will expressly exclude any adjudication by a juvenile court or any other court order or action taken with respect to a person who is under the process and jurisdiction of the juvenile court law.

AB 2028: Reinstatement of PERS Benefits

AB 2028 adds section 20969.3 to the Government Code and applies it to all active Public Employees’ Retirement System (PERS) school and local agency members. Pursuant to AB 2028, a member who is involuntarily terminated on or after January 1, 2017 and is later reinstated to that employment pursuant to an administrative, arbitral or judicial proceeding – including proceedings before school boards – is entitled to reinstatement with all retirement benefits that the member otherwise would have accrued. In addition, PERS contributions must be made, and service credit given, for any period for which salary is awarded in the proceeding. The reinstatement of benefits is effective as of the date from which salary is awarded. Employers are required to notify PERS of the final decision ordering the member’s reinstatement within five days of the date the decision becomes final.

For more information on these new laws, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our 10 offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter or download our Client News Brief App.

Written by:

Marisa Lincoln


Sarah Starcevich Miller

Senior Counsel

Nicholas Smith


©2016 Lozano Smith
As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.