California Supreme Court Holds Firefighting Immunity Under California’s Government Claims Act Is A Waivable Affirmative Defense

October 2019
Number 45

In Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection District, the California Supreme Court rejected the midtrial dismissal of a lawsuit involving a firefighter who suffered severe and permanent injuries after she was run over by a water truck while sleeping at a base camp. The court held that a firefighting immunity under Government Code section 850.4, part of California’s Government Claims Act (GCA) (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) is an affirmative defense which must be raised before trial and may be waived absent timely assertion.

Background

Plaintiff Rebecca Quigley was a U.S. Forest Service firefighter and part of a team assigned to assist with a large fire which broke out in the Plumas National Forest in September 2009. While Quigley was fighting the fire, she had to sleep at a base camp with other firefighters. One night, while Quigley was sleeping in a field in her sleeping bag, an employee of an independent contractor who was servicing a nearby shower unit drove his truck onto the field where Quigley was sleeping, severely injuring her. Quigley sued Garden Valley Fire Protection District, Chester Fire Protection District, and their employees for damages based upon claims of negligence, failure to warn, and dangerous condition of public property.

During the trial, defense counsel filed a motion for nonsuit arguing, for the first time, that the defendants were entitled to immunity under Government Code section 850.4, which grants public agencies and public employees immunity against claims for injuries caused by fighting fires. The trial court granted the motion, rejecting Quigley’s argument that the defendants waived the immunity defense when they failed to invoke immunity in their answer to her complaint. The trial court specifically ruled that Government Code section 850.4 immunity-one of several governmental immunities provided for under the Government Claims Act -is jurisdictional and therefore could be raised by a defendant at any time, including during trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the nonsuit in favor of the defendants and found that the defendants were immune from liability based upon a broad interpretation of section 850.4, and that such immunity is jurisdictional and thus can be raised at any time.

The Court’s Opinion

On review, the California Supreme Court considered whether the subject governmental immunity provision, section 850.4, constituted an affirmative defense, which a defendant must timely raise, or whether such immunity was absolute so that it served as a limitation on the fundamental jurisdiction of the courts. Affirmative defenses are considered waived if not timely asserted. In reaching its conclusion, the state high court affirmed that section 850.4 in fact confers an absolute immunity from liability.However, the court distinguished absolute immunity from a question of fundamental jurisdiction, and found the section 850.4 also operates as an affirmative defense. In other words, even as an absolute immunity, section 850.4 is only effective as a shield from liability if a defendant invokes the immunity before trial as an affirmative defense.

The court found that there existed a factual dispute as to whether the defendants timely invoked firefighting immunity when they raised an affirmative defense in their answer which broadly cited all the applicable immunity provisions “from Sections 810 to 996.6, inclusive” of the Government Claims Act. The court remanded the case back to the appellate court for further adjudication on this issue.

Takeaways

Quigley is significant in that it clarifies that defendants must timely invoke the absolute firefighting immunity provided for by Government Code section 850.4 in order to reap the benefits of the affirmative defense. Critically, it is likely that the court’s analysis in this respect will apply to the timely assertion of the other governmental immunity defenses provided for under the Government Claims Act.

If you have any questions about the Quigley case or about government claims in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Sloan R. Simmons

Partner

Lauren A. Lyman

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Significant New Developer Fee Cases

October 2019
Number 44

As part of an uptick of cases in recent years regarding school impact fees, two recent cases argued by Lozano Smith on behalf of school districts have been decided by the California Sixth District Court of Appeal, with mixed results. The court ruled in relation to an “adults only” agricultural worker housing project that, when imposing prospective developer fees on development projects, school districts need not establish a reasonable relationship between the fee and the specific project in question. Instead, districts are merely required to establish a nexus between the fee and the general type of project that is at issue (e.g. residential, commercial, industrial). This favorable outcome came after the same appellate court, straying from prior precedent that supported deference to local agencies, issued a published decision invalidating a school district’s developer fee justification study. The court held that the study in question was invalid because it did not provide sufficient analysis to demonstrate that the school district would have to house new students generated from development in new facilities. Both cases are part of a trend toward greater judicial scrutiny of school districts’ imposition of developer fees.

School districts in California are authorized by law to impose fees on development projects, referred to as “developer fees” or “school impact fees.” There are three separate levels of fees that can be charged, each of which are subject to different legal requirements. The first case below addresses whether a school district must analyze the potential residential population of a particular development, as projected by the developer, before imposing fees on that particular development. The second case addresses the legal requirements for preparing a Level I fee justification study.

The Tanimura Case

Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods v. Salinas Union High School District, 34 Cal.App.5th 775, addressed a dispute regarding Level 2 developer fees. The Salinas Union High School District (Salinas) had imposed a developer fee on a 100-unit agricultural employee housing complex commissioned by Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc. (Tanimura) within Salinas. The complex, per the terms of its development permit issued by the Monterey County Board of Supervisors, was designed to house only agricultural workers, without dependents.

In recent years, many school districts have contended with developers who argue that fees should not be imposed on their projects because the developers expect that few or no potential school age students will live in the finished project. These arguments have been made, for instance, regarding housing intended for agricultural workers, college students, or young professionals. This case affirms that a school district need not consider the developer’s intended residents for a particular project, and can instead analyze the impact of residential housing projects across the district when imposing developer fees on residential projects.

In relation to its agricultural worker housing project, Tanimura sued for a refund of its fees, alleging that the developer fees imposed by Salinas were not reasonably related to a need for school facilities, as required by statute. Tanimura cited the project’s prohibition on dependents, arguing that, as no children would reside in the complex, its construction would not generate an increased burden on the district’s facilities. The Government Code requires a public agency, before imposing prospective developer fees, to establish the purpose of the fee, the agency’s use for the funds, a reasonable relationship between the fee’s use and the type of development project on which it will be imposed, and a reasonable relationship between the need for public facilities and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed. The trial court held in favor of Tanimura, reasoning that “case law-and common sense-preclude the application of an overbroad label in a fee study that does not account for a project’s actual impact.” The court opined that Salinas was required to account for the fact that no children would be permitted to live at the complex, and in failing to do so had not met the nexus requirement of the Government Code.

In a victory for school districts, and following argument by Lozano Smith (acting as co-counsel in this matter), the Court of Appeal reversed. The court held that, when establishing a nexus between developer fees and a development project, a public agency need not consider the specific project in question; its calculus is limited to the general type of project at issue (e.g., residential, commercial, or industrial). As applied here, Salinas was not required to consider the complex’s prohibition on dependents in its fee analysis. The district’s treatment of the complex as a generic, residential development was lawful.

The court asserted that its interpretation was the only “commonsense” reading of the statute that avoided practical absurdities. To adopt Tanimura’s position, the court held, “would have the practical effect of requiring a school district to expand its needs analysis to address the projected impact on school facilities of undefined, variant subtypes of residential construction not contemplated in the statute.” The court found such an effect to be contrary with the purpose of the statutes. Further, the law contains exceptions from developer fees for certain types of developments, including government-financed agricultural migrant worker housing. However, the Legislature has created no such exception for privately-financed farmworker housing. This indicates that the Legislature did not intend for projects such as the complex to be exempted from developer fees.

The Summerhill Case

In Summerhill Winchester, LLC, v. Campbell Union School District 30 Cal.App.5th 545, the Appellate Court invalidated the Level 1 developer fees adopted by Campbell Union School District (Campbell). In doing so, the court applied the rule laid out in a prior case, Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board of the Milpitas Unified School District (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 218, that a Level 1 fee study must include an analysis of the following three factors: (1) the projection of the total amount of housing to be constructed within the school district; (2) estimation of the number of new students that are expected to result from the new development; and (3) estimation of what it will cost to provide the necessary school facilities for that approximate number of new students.

Regarding the first Shapell element, Campbell’s fee study stated that there were “in excess of 133” residential units that could be constructed over the next five years. The court took issue with the fact that these projections were not based on data from all of the planning departments within Campbell’s boundaries. The court also held that the study’s projection was too vague to support the imposition of fees. According to the court, a projection based on consultation with only some of the local jurisdictions within Campbell’s boundaries and using a phrase such as “in excess of” is “little better than saying that ‘some’ development is anticipated.” This was found to be inadequate because the study did not provide sufficient guidance for Campbell’s Board to determine whether or not new school facilities would be needed due to anticipated development. The court found it irrelevant that the district was already over capacity at all of its schools, and essentially rejected Campbell’s argument that new facilities would be needed to house students generated from development, regardless of the number of such students.

The court also found that the fee study was invalid because it did not provide sufficient evidence for the district’s Board to determine what type of school facilities would be needed to accommodate students generated by development, if any. The court based its decision on a narrow reading of the applicable statutes.

Developers may argue that the court’s decision means that a fee study must now establish what “type” of facilities a school district will construct to house students generated by development. However, prior case law, includingGarrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School District (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320, held that specific improvement plans or building proposals were not necessary. The court acknowledged that, underGarrick, “the Board did not have to identify specific facilities that would be built or make concrete construction plans.” At the same time, however, the court concluded that “the key missing element in the fee study was what new facilities would be necessary for the new students generated by new development.” These two statements are difficult to reconcile, and create a challenge when school districts decide how specifically their fee studies must describe student housing needs. However, it remains clear that specific school construction projects need not be identified.

The court’s opinion is likely to cause confusion and possibly to disrupt established law. As a result, school districts may wish to review the adequacy of their fee justification studies.

Lozano Smith represented the school district in the litigation and appeal, and requested, on behalf of the district, that the California Supreme Court depublish the case. The request for depublication was supported by CASBO, CASH, and CSBA, and not opposed, but the request was nevertheless denied by the Supreme Court.

Takeaways

Tanimura clarifies that public agencies, when imposing prospective developer fees, need not consider the specific development project, but only the type of development project at issue. The case should also help school districts resist the claims of developers who assert that they should be relieved of fees because few or no students will allegedly be generated by a specific project.

While some may argue for a broader application, the Summerhill decision can be viewed as the court’s application of the three-factorShapell test to a particular fee study. In this regard, the case simply calls for a fact-specific analysis based on already-established precedent. The following are some best practices following the Summerhill case:

  • Avoid use of imprecise language like “at least” when describing projected development.
  • If at all possible, consult with all planning departments within the school district’s jurisdiction.
  • If at all possible, identify the general types of school facility projects that may be constructed to accommodate students (e.g., new school construction, portable additions, a mix of both, etc.). We note that such identification in the fee study is not necessarily binding on the school district when it later implements its facilities plans.

If you have any questions about the Tanimura orSummerhill cases or about developer fees in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. Copies of Lozano Smith’s Developer Fee Handbook are available for purchase from Lozano Smith’s Client Services Department; you can submit your request to clientservices@lozanosmith.com. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Harold M. Freiman

Partner

Devon B. Lincoln

Partner

Kelly M. Rem

Partner

Benjamin Brown

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

California Expands Definition Of Domestic Partners To Include Opposite Sex Couples

October 2019
Number 63

In California, registered domestic partners have “the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under the law” as spouses. (Fam. Code § 297.5, subd. (a).) Existing law limits domestic partnerships, among other requirements, to two groups of individuals: (1) couples of the same sex or (2) couples of the opposite sex, one or both of whom are over the age of 62 and eligible for social security benefits. On July 30, 2019, Governor Newsom signed Senate Bill (SB) 30 which eliminates these criteria for registering as domestic partners. As of January 1, 2020, any couple over the age of 18 (or under 18 with a court order), regardless of gender, can enter into a domestic partnership. This expansion has significant legal implications for California employers, including public entity employers.

Policy and Review of Collective Bargaining Agreements

To the extent an employer has policies, negotiated collective bargaining agreements, or employee handbooks that address domestic partnerships, it is important for employers to review such documents to ensure compliance with SB 30.

Health Benefits and Other Considerations

In light of SB 30, employers may have more employees eligible and interested in enrolling their domestic partner in an employer-sponsored healthcare plan. If such plan, whether self-insured or otherwise, offers health benefits to spouses then it must afford the same health benefits to registered domestic partners, under the same terms and conditions. Employers may, but are not required to, offer healthcare benefits to unregistered domestic partners as well. Employers should review the terms and conditions of their insurance policies/healthcare plans to ensure compliance with SB 30.

Because healthcare benefits are generally included as part of an employee’s wage for tax purposes, absent an exception, there may be related tax implications that employers should be aware of.

For more information about SB 30 and its implications for employers, or to discuss any other labor or employment questions, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Gabriela D. Flowers

Partner

Carolyn L. Gemma

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

AB 392 Changes Use of Force Standards

October 2019
Number 47

Governor Gavin Newsom has signed the California Act to Save Lives (AB 392) into law. AB 392 modifies the standards surrounding the use of deadly force by Police and other peace officers in the line of duty.

California Penal Code section 196, enacted in 1872, was the single oldest un-amended law enforcement use of force statute in the country. This Penal Code section provided that killing by police was justifiable when necessarily committed when arresting or retaking felons who are fleeing, resisting, or who have escaped. In addition, California Penal Code section 835a authorized police to use force to arrest, prevent escape, and overcome resistance – without requiring the force to be proportional.

AB 392 significantly changes these rules, including amending the longstanding justifiable homicide standard. The bill states, “Peace officers are justified in using deadly force upon another person only when the officer reasonably believes, based on the totality of the circumstances, that such force is necessary.” The new law goes on to state that the use of deadly force is limited to two circumstances. First, deadly force may be used when the officer reasonably believes it necessary to defend themselves against “an imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.” Second, deadly force may be used in order to apprehend a person fleeing from a felony that may have caused or resulted in death or serious bodily injury or where the officer reasonably believes that the fleeing person will pose a similar danger to another unless “immediately apprehended.” However, prior to the use of deadly force to apprehend a fleeing person the officer must make “reasonable efforts” to identify themselves as an officer and warn that deadly force may be used. The officer does not have to identify and warn if they have objectively reasonable grounds to believe that that the person is aware of those facts.

AB 392 also includes a clarification that de-escalation techniques should be used by law enforcement agencies prior to the use of deadly force. When reviewing situations in which deadly force has been used, the new law requires such review be done under the “totality of circumstances” standard. That is a review of all facts known to the officer at the time, including the conduct of the officer and the subject leading up to the use of deadly force. Departments may want to provide updated training and information to their officers following this new law.

For more information about AB 392, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Jenell Van Bindsbergen

Partner

Junaid Halani

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

New Law Clarifies Anti-Discrimination Laws Include Hair Discrimination

August 2019
Number 38

The California Legislature recently passed Senate Bill (SB) 188, known as the CROWN Act, which amends the definition of “race” contained in state anti-discrimination laws under both the Fair Employment and Housing Act and the Education Code to include “hair texture and protective hairstyles.” The new law does not mean that public agencies have to change their dress codes unless specific hair texture and hairstyles are specified in their policy. Rather, the new law clarifies that dress codes may be considered discriminatory if they explicitly or implicitly affect individuals who have their hair textured or styled in a manner historically associated with their race. For example, a public agency could not have a policy restricting Black workers or students from wearing dreadlocks, twists, or braids. Further, a public agency could not enforce a policy demanding “professional” or “clean and tidy” hair that effectively limits workers or students from wearing dreadlocks, twists, or braids.

Courts and administrative agencies have routinely and clearly established that public agencies have a management prerogative to impose non-discriminatory employee dress code policies. Indeed, in the K-12 school context, there is a heightened importance associated with standards for professional appearance because employees’ behavior is often imitated or modeled by students. Similarly, courts have held that school districts may impose viewpoint neutral and content neutral dress code policies for students as long as they are implemented in a consistent and equal manner among all students.

The California Legislature passed the CROWN Act to provide clarity in light of recent federal case law declining to extend anti-discrimination protections based on hairstyles or textures commonly associated with a protected class. Because hair can be changed (i.e., is mutable), federal courts have refused to equate hairstyle with race, with a limited exception for afros, and thus limited Title VII race discrimination claims to only protect against “immutable characteristics.” In contrast, the legislative analysis for SB 188 notes that discrimination is often not based on the immutable nature of a trait but is instead based on the trait’s connection with an identity associated with a protected characteristic.

Importantly, the new law reaffirms a public agency’s control over dress code policies for employees and students. These dress code policies will be lawful so long as they are imposed in a valid and non-discriminatory manner with no disparate impact on individuals based on their dress and appearance’s association with a protected characteristic. Public agencies should review their existing dress code enforcement practices to ensure compliance with SB 188. In addition, public agencies may consider conducting implicit bias training and refocus practices to ensure inclusivity and compliance with this new law.

For more information about SB 188 or about public agency dress code policies in general, whether directed at employees or students, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Gabriela D. Flowers

Partner

Joshua Whiteside

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

U.S. Supreme Court Overrules Precedent And Opens the Federal Court Door to Takings Lawsuits Before Exhaustion of State Law Just Compensation Remedies

August 2019
Number 37

The Supreme Court of the United States held in Knick v. Township of Scott that plaintiffs claiming a local government action has interfered with their use of property may bring their constitutional “takings lawsuit” under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 directly in federal court, and before exhausting other related state law remedies. The Supreme Court’s opinion overruled a 34-year old precedent requiring plaintiffs to first seek just compensation under state law in state court. This is a major change in takings law, which alters long-held takings strategies used by local agencies.

The United States Constitution prohibits the “taking” of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation. In Knick, the Township of Scott informed a private landowner that her property, which contained a small graveyard, must be opened to the public during daylight hours, pursuant to a local cemetery ordinance. The landowner brought an action in federal court alleging that the ordinance’s mandatory public access requirement effected a “taking” of her property without the payment of just compensation. Existing, long standing Supreme Court precedent, specifically, the opinion in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, required plaintiffs to first seek just compensation under state law in state court before bringing a federal takings claims. Because landowner had proceeded directly to federal court without first seeking a state court remedy, the U.S. District Court dismissed her action.

The 1985 Williamson County opinion had held that the constitutional prohibition on the taking of private property has not been violated until the government denies payment of just compensation. Williamson County drew from cases dating back to 1890 for the proposition that just compensation does not need to be paid to the private property owner at the time of the taking, provided a “reasonable, certain, and adequate” mechanism exists for obtaining just compensation, such as an inverse condemnation action in state court. On this authority, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for violation of the takings clause until just compensation has been denied by the state. However, as a perhaps unintended consequence, federal law requires federal courts to give preclusive effect to state court decisions. This means that a plaintiff who loses its inverse condemnation case in state court would often be barred from then bringing a claim in federal court due to the issue preclusion rule.

In Knick, the Supreme Court overruled the Williamson County precedent, holding “[i]f a local government takes private property without paying for it, that government has violated the Fifth Amendment, just as the Takings Clause says, without regard to subsequent state court proceedings. And the property owner may sue the government at the time in federal court for the ‘deprivation’ of a right secured by the Constitution.” The assertion of an uncompensated taking is now enough to obtain immediate standing to sue in federal court on an immediate basis.

The Supreme Court’s Knick opinion decision means that plaintiffs may sue local governments in federal court for alleged “takings” withoutfirst bringing a state court inverse condemnation action.

For further information regarding the Knick opinion, or governmental land use and taking issues in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

William P. Curley III

Partner

Nicholas J. Clair

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Police Officer’s Pre-Promotion Conduct Could Be Basis to Rescind Promotion

July 2019
Number 35

On June 14, 2019 the California Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District issued its opinion in Conger v. County of Los Angeles, finding that denying a police officer’s promotion because of his conduct prior to the promotion, was not a violation of his rights and was instead a legitimate merit-based decision.

In November 2015, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department promoted Sergeant Thomas L. Conger to the rank of lieutenant, a position subject to a six-month probationary period. In mid-April 2016, before the six-month probationary period expired, Conger was informed that he was being investigated for a use of force incident that occurred before Conger’s probationary promotion. As a result, the probationary period was extended. In May 2016, while still on probation, Conger was released from the probationary position of lieutenant due to his failure to adhere to Department policies regarding use of force. The evaluation period was listed as November 1, 2015, to May 20, 2016, but the incident described in the evaluation was the May 21, 2015 use of force incident that had occurred almost six months before the promotion.

Conger filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the trial court, arguing that the promotion rescission was based on alleged misconduct that happened before he was promoted, and constituted a “denial of promotion on grounds other than merit” pursuant to the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (POBR) Act (Government Code section 3300, et seq.), and therefore he was entitled to an administrative appeal hearing.

The trial court denied Conger’s petition, concluding that Conger could be denied a promotion based on merit factors arising prior to the probationary period because section 3304(b)’s relevant period was not limited to the duration of the probation itself. The trial court found that the decision to rescind the promotion based on Conger’s failure to report a use of force was merit-based.

Conger appealed and the California Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court observed that an employer may deny a promotion without triggering the right to appeal under POBR so long as the denial is based on merit. The court noted that while a demotion is one of the listed punitive actions under section 3303 that triggers the administrative appeal right, regardless of whether it was based on merit or nonmerit grounds, this promotion was not yet permanent and thus its denial did not qualify as a demotion. The court found that the critical factor was that the adverse action took place during the probationary period while the employer was still assessing whether the officer deserved the higher position. The court concluded that Conger’s release from his probationary position before he achieved permanent status constituted a “denial of promotion” for POBR purposes, and not a “demotion.” While this decision establishes that an agency may consider a police officer’s pre-promotion conduct during the probationary period, and that a subsequent denial of a promotion based on such conduct may be found to be merit-based, it is still a fact-specific analysis and does not mean that every situation will result in an officer being ineligible for the administrative appeal.

If you have any questions about probationary considerations in promotions of police officers, or about the POBR in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Jenell Van Bindsbergen

Partner

Michele R. Lyons

Senior Counsel

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.