Supreme Court Denies Review of Lease-Leaseback Case

August 2015
Number 48

In a closely watched case, the California Supreme Court has denied petitions for review of the opinion in Davis v. Fresno Unified School District (June 1, 2015) case no. F068477 (5th App. Dist.). The Court has also denied requests for depublication of the case by the school district and various statewide organizations interested in the outcome. This means that a lawsuit will be allowed to proceed against a particular lease-leaseback arrangement that is similar to many in use by school districts in the State, and the trial court will be bound by the guidance provided by the Fifth District Court of Appeal in its decision. The lawsuit will also be allowed to proceed on a civil cause of action for conflict of interest under Government Code section 1090, et seq., seeking to invalidate the contract on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest involving an outside consultant.

As addressed in our recent CNB (See Client News Brief No. 30, June 2015), the appellate court’s decision called into question a number of aspects of many school district lease-leaseback agreements. TheDavis court also addressed conflict of interest in a manner that is applicable to all local agencies. The court allowed further legal action on a claim that the contractor, as a pre-construction consultant to the school district, participated in the making of a contract in which it subsequently became financially interested, and thus potentially violated conflict of interest laws. With today’s action by the Supreme Court, the appellate court’s opinion will remain binding law, although it could be overturned in the future by legislative action or, eventually, by a further appellate ruling if the case is again appealed after the trial court has completed proceedings in this case.

Lozano Smith will be monitoring the Davis case, which will now return to the trial court, and will report on any significant developments. Because of the scrutiny of lease-leaseback agreements that has followed the Davis case, and may continue until the case is finally resolved, school districts may wish to work particularly closely with their legal counsel on lease-leaseback issues and agreements. Similarly, for all public agencies, care should be taken when considering issuing contracts to consultants who have previously advised the agency on a related matter.

If you have any questions regarding this case or lease-leaseback agreements that school districts may have in place or are considering, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Megan Macy
Partner
Sacramento Office
mmacy@lozanosmith.com

Devon B. Lincoln
Partner
Monterey Office
dlincoln@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

California Appellate Court Holds That Closed Session Agenda Language Substantially Complies with the Brown Act Despite Errors in Agenda Item

August 2015
Number 47

In Castaic Lake Water Agency v. Newhall County Water District, et al. (Castaic) (June 26, 2015) 2015 Cal. App. Lexis 641, the court of appeal recently addressed the question of what constitutes substantial compliance with the Brown Act’s agenda requirements. The court addressed whether the Newhall County Water District’s (Newhall) description of a closed session agenda item complied with the Brown Act. The court held that Newhall substantially complied with the Brown Act despite the fact that Newhall did not utilize “safe harbor” language to describe the subject of the closed session and cited to the wrong specific provision of the Brown Act in relation to the agenda item.

The Brown Act allows for legislative bodies to hold closed sessions in enumerated circumstances, provided that the agenda sufficiently describes the matters being discussed. The Brown Act contains specific “safe harbor” language for closed session items, usage of which is presumed to comply with the Brown Act.

When conferring with legal counsel regarding litigation in closed session, Government Code section 54954.5, subdivision (c), provides safe harbor language applicable to three specific scenarios as follows: existing litigation, exposure to litigation, or initiation of litigation. In Castaic, Newhall’s board considered the last category, initiation of litigation. For this item, the designated Brown Act safe harbor language is:

CONFERENCE WITH LEGAL COUNSEL – ANTICIPATED LITIGATION
Initiation of litigation pursuant to paragraph (4) of subdivision (d) of Section 54956.9 (Specify number of potential cases).

Newhall’s closed session agenda to discuss initiating litigation against the Castaic Lake Water Agency instead described the item as “Conference with Legal Counsel pursuant to Government Code Section 54956.9(c) to discuss potential litigations (2 cases).” This item did not track the Brown Act’s safe harbor language and did not specify that the closed session was to consider initiating litigation, as opposed to defending or prosecuting an existing case, or discussing exposure to litigation, which are other permissible closed session topics set forth in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (d) of Government Code section 54956.9.

In holding that Newhall nevertheless substantially complied with the Brown Act, the appellate court reasoned that Newhall’s errors were merely technical and that the substance of the notice properly informed the public that the agency was going to meet to discuss potential litigation. The court reached this conclusion even though Newhall’s agenda said nothing about initiating litigation.

Castaic appears to go somewhat further than prior cases interpreting the Brown Act by finding substantial compliance despite discrepancies between the agency’s agenda and the prescribed safe harbor language where the specific type of litigation at issue – in this case initiating litigation (where the agency is a plaintiff) versus exposure to litigation (where the agency is a defendant) – was not identified. This decision reaffirms the principle of substantial compliance, and that if a local agency commits what is determined to be a minor drafting error when preparing a closed session agenda item, a court might not find a Brown Act violation.

It is not yet known whether the Castaic Lake Water Agency will appeal this decision to the California Supreme Court. Lozano Smith will continue to monitor the case.

For further information about this case and the Brown Act’s open meeting requirements, including how public agencies should provide notice for closed sessions within meetings, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Harold M. Freiman
Partner
Walnut Creek Office
hfreiman@lozanosmith.com

Eric Barba
Associate
Walnut Creek Office
ebarba@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

New Immunity for Physicians Prescribing Epinephrine Auto-Injectors Increases Likelihood of Local Educational Agencies Obtaining Prescriptions

August 2015
Number 46

Governor Jerry Brown recently signed Senate Bill (SB) 738 into law, which provides qualified immunity to physicians who issue a prescription for epinephrine auto-injectors (commonly known as “EpiPens”) to a local educational agency (LEA), such as a school district, county office of education, or charter school. The qualified immunity provided would prohibit a prescribing physician from being subject to professional review, being liable in a civil action, or being subject to criminal prosecution due to prescribing epinephrine auto-injectors. An exception exists if the physician’s issuance of the prescription for the epinephrine auto-injectors constitutes gross negligence or willful or malicious conduct.

Previously, physicians were not provided liability protections for prescribing epinephrine auto-injectors to LEAs, despite the passage of SB 1266 in September 2014. SB 1266 required LEAs to provide emergency epinephrine auto-injectors to school nurses or personnel who have volunteered and received the required training (See Client News Brief No. 66, September 2014).

The absence of qualified immunity made it difficult for some LEAs to obtain the required prescriptions for epinephrine auto-injectors as some physicians were unwilling to issue a prescription out of concern for the potential liability. The passage of SB 738 provides physicians with protections afforded to other persons and entities who comply with epinephrine auto-injector laws and is likely to minimize school districts’ difficulties in obtaining prescriptions for epinephrine auto-injectors.

If you have any questions regarding physician immunity for writing prescriptions for epinephrine auto-injectors or complying with SB 1266, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Ricardo R. Silva
Partner
San Diego Office
rsilva@lozanosmith.com

Colleen R. Villarreal
Associate
Sacramento Office
cvillarreal@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

The Legislature Further Limits Expungement of Documents Demonstrating Egregious Misconduct from Certificated Employee Files

August 2015
Number 45

The Governor recently signed Assembly Bill (AB) 1452, which further limits a school district’s treatment of certificated employee records involving “egregious misconduct.” Education Code section 44932 prohibits a permanent certificated employee from being dismissed, except for certain enumerated causes including egregious misconduct. “Egregious misconduct” is defined exclusively as immoral conduct that involves certain sex offenses (Ed. Code § 44010), drug offenses (Ed. Code § 44011), and/or conduct that violates the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (Pen. Code §§ 11165.2 to 11165.6).

Currently, Education Code section 44939.5 prohibits school districts from entering into agreements authorizing the expungement of any credible complaints of, substantiated investigations into, or discipline for, egregious misconduct from a school employee’s personnel file. AB 1452, which takes effect January 1, 2016, further expands this prohibition by amending Education Code section 44939.5 to prohibit school districts from directly expunging an employee’s personnel file to remove credible complaints or investigations of or discipline for egregious misconduct. A school district retains the right to expunge, or to enter into an agreement to expunge, egregious misconduct from the employee’s file following a hearing where the employee prevailed, the allegations were determined to be unsubstantiated or the discipline was determined to be unwarranted.

As a reminder, Education Code section 44939.5 requires that if a school district or county office of education has reported an employee to the Commission on Teacher Credentialing based on allegations of egregious misconduct, the district or county office is required to disclose this to any school district, county office or charter school that makes an employment inquiry about the employee.

If you have questions about AB 1452 or its impact on your school district procedures, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Dulcinea Grantham
Partner
Walnut Creek Office
dgrantham@lozanosmith.com

Samantha Corner
Associate
Monterey Office
scorner@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Legal “Round-up”: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Education World

August 2015
Number 44

The United States Supreme Court recently held that all states are required to license same-sex marriages and recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out of state. (Obergefell, et al. v. Hodges, (June 26, 2015) 2015 U.S. Lexis 4250.) While monumental on a national level, this ruling is just the latest event in the rapidly changing legal landscape relating to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. These issues are commonly described as affecting individuals who are lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT).

School and college districts face unique challenges when incorporating legal and societal changes into their day-to-day operations that involve two separate groups: the students they serve and the individuals they employ. To assist county offices of education, school and college districts, and charter schools in staying up-to-date, a synopsis of recent legal developments related to both students and employees is provided below. The following are key terms at the center of this discourse. The definitions provided are based on definitions available through legal and advocacy resources, the field of psychology, and general common usage:

    • “Sexual orientation” refers to heterosexuality, homosexuality, and bisexuality and means the emotional and sexual attraction to another person based upon gender.

 

    • “Gender” means a person’s sex and includes gender identity and gender expression.

 

    • “Gender identity” means an individual’s sense of being masculine, feminine, both or neither, regardless of one’s biological sex or assigned sex at birth. Gender identity is not necessarily observable or exhibited through gender expression or sexual orientation.

 

    • “Gender expression” means a person’s gender-related appearance and behavior whether or not associated with the person’s assigned sex at birth.

 

  • Transgender is an umbrella term describing an individual whose gender identity and/or expression is different from their biological sex and the way in which males or females are commonly expected to present themselves.

LGBT Issues in the Employment Context
Legal protections related to sexual orientation and gender identity are contained in state and federal laws addressing nondiscrimination and harassment. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a federal law, prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Courts and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, the federal agency responsible for enforcement of Title VII, have held that discrimination against an individual on the basis of non-conforming gender identity and sex-stereotyping is discrimination on the basis of sex. California state law, through the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”; Gov. Code § 12940, et seq.) goes a step further and specifically includes sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression as protected classes of their own, in addition to sex and gender generally.

Under both state and federal law, health benefits must be available to same-sex spouses on the same basis as that provided to opposite-sex spouses.

LGBT Issues in the Education Context

California law provides protections against discrimination based upon sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, and gender expression in the education-related context, as set forth in Education Code section 220. California law also requires school districts to adopt policies prohibiting discrimination, harassment, intimidation, and bullying on the basis of these characteristics, and the overall legislative focus on bullying issues has been growing over the past several years. (Ed. Code § 234.1.) Further, federal law under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires school districts to adopt and distribute a policy that they will not discriminate on the basis of sex in their education programs and activities. School districts, and in some cases school officials, may be held liable for their willful failure to address behavior in violation of these requirements. The sex discrimination provisions of Title IX have been read by courts to include discrimination against homosexual students. The U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has increasingly attempted to extend rights to students based on their gender identity by treating gender identity as a sex-based protection, even though federal law does not expressly identify sexual orientation, gender identity, or gender expression as protected classifications.

As of 2014, school districts in California must allow a student to participate in sex-segregated school programs and activities, and use facilities, consistent with the student’s gender identity regardless of the student’s biological sex. (Ed. Code § 221.5.) Importantly, Section 221.5 does not allow a school district to require transgender students to use neutral or separate facilities, such as restrooms or locker rooms. Further, there is no legal guidance regarding how a district determines a student’s gender identity, or how the privacy and religious rights of other students and their parents should be accommodated in the use of private spaces. While not binding, OCR has also made it clear that it interprets Title IX to require similar access and accommodations for transgender students. Even though there is no current statute related to the use of facilities by transgender employees, a school district would arguably violate FEHA’s non-discrimination provisions by limiting a transgender employee’s use of facilities, such as restrooms, based upon the employee’s biological sex. Additionally, the Title VII issues related to employees discussed in the section above are also implicated and should be considered. Beyond these legal access issues, California Interscholastic Federation (CIF) bylaws regarding eligibility were amended in 2013 to provide that students may participate in CIF activities in a manner that is consistent with their gender identity, irrespective of the gender listed on a student’s records.

Changes in the law relating to LGBT issues also affect the educational curriculum. Under California law, school curricula must include references to the contributions of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender Americans, among other groups, when teaching about the economic, political, and social development of California and the United States. (Ed. Code § 51204.5.) School districts are also prohibited from adopting instructional materials that reflect adversely upon groups identified in Section 220 of the Education Code, including LGBT persons. (Ed. Code §§ 51501, 60040, 60044.)

Finally, school districts are required to provide access to student groups on a content-neutral basis. If a public secondary school allows at least one student group that is not curriculum-related to meet on school premises during non-instructional time, it has created a “limited open forum,” and the school must provide equal access to all non-curricular student clubs, including gay-straight alliance clubs. “Access” would include meeting spaces, visible recognition, and the privileges afforded to other student groups.

Public schools are affected by the developing law on LGBT issues and it is important for school districts to stay abreast of the rapidly changing legal environment. Knowledge of these laws will protect a school district’s employees and students from discrimination, and can help school districts avoid unintended legal liabilities.

If you have any questions regarding the topics discussed above or regarding whether your existing policies or regulations are compliant with the requirements discussed above, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Darren C. Kameya
Partner
Los Angeles Office
dkameya@lozanosmith.com

Benjamin C. Rosenbaum
Associate
Fresno Office
brosenbaum@lozanosmith.com

Niki Nabavi Nouri
Associate
Walnut Creek Office
nnabavinouri@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Employee’s Inability to Work Under a Particular Supervisor is Not a Disability Under FEHA

August 2015
Number 43

The California Court of Appeal recently held that an employee’s inability to work with her supervisor due to stress and anxiety did not qualify as a disability protected under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).

In 2010, Michaelin Higgins-Williams, a clinic assistant for Sutter Medical Foundation who had been diagnosed with adjustment disorder and anxiety, took an approved medical leave based on stress and anxiety caused by interactions with her manager. (Higgins-Williams v. Sutter Medical Foundation (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 78.) Ms. Higgins-Williams returned to work in August 2010 after exhausting the leave provided by the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the California Family Rights Act (CFRA).

On her return, Ms. Higgins-Williams received a negative evaluation from her supervisor-the first negative evaluation she had received since starting work at Sutter in 2007. The following month, her supervisor grabbed Ms. Higgins-Williams and yelled at her. Her regional manager ostracized Ms. Higgins-Williams while exhibiting friendly behavior toward other staff. In mid-September 2010, Ms. Higgins-Williams requested a leave of absence, which was granted. While on leave, Ms. Higgins-Williams’ doctor notified Sutter that Ms. Higgins-Williams needed to transfer to another department. Sutter, however, did not transfer Ms. Higgins-Williams.

In late December 2010, Ms. Higgins-Williams’ doctor notified Sutter that she could return to work. Disagreeing with the doctor’s conclusion that she was able to return to work, Ms. Higgins-Williams requested additional leave on January 6, 2011. On January 24, 2011, Sutter informed Ms. Higgins-Williams that there was “no information to support a conclusion that additional leave as an accommodation would effectuate” her return to work as a clinical assistant. Sutter notified Ms. Higgins-Williams that she had until January 31, 2011 to provide such information or else her employment would be terminated. Ms. Higgins-Williams failed to provide the requested information and Sutter terminated her employment on February 1, 2011.

Ms. Higgins-Williams sued Sutter, alleging that Sutter: i) discriminated against her based on a mental disability; ii) failed to engage in the interactive process to make a reasonable accommodation for her disability; iii) retaliated against her for requesting a disability accommodation; and iv) wrongfully terminated her in violation of public policy.

The court determined that Ms. Higgins-Williams’ stated disability, anxiety caused by her supervisor, did not constitute a qualifying disability under FEHA. In arriving at this conclusion, the court relied heavily on Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 628, which held that “the inability to perform one particular job or to work under a particular supervisor, does not constitute a qualified disability under FEHA.” While the court acknowledged that portions of Hobson had been disapproved in subsequent decisions, the finding that an inability to work under a particular supervisor was not a disability under FEHA remained intact. Therefore, because Ms. Higgins-Williams did not suffer from a qualifying disability, she was not entitled to the protections afforded by FEHA.

Ms. Higgins-Williams’ claim that she was wrongfully terminated in violation of public policy for using FMLA/CFRA leave was similarly denied by the court, as it found that Sutter had a legitimate reason for terminating her employment and Ms. Higgins-Williams failed to demonstrate that such reason was pretextual.

While this case provides additional guidance as to what constitutes a qualifying disability under FEHA, it does not simplify the disability accommodation process or analysis. For instance, anxiety caused exclusively by an employee’s supervisor would not qualify as a FEHA disability under Higgins-Williams. On the other hand, an employee’s pre-existing mental disease or illness, exacerbated by interactions with the employee’s supervisor, may qualify as a disability under Higgins-Williams as a psychiatric disability related to supervision in general, or for other reasons recognized by FEHA (e.g., a disability that limits a major life activity).

It is crucial for employers to exercise good faith in determining whether an employee has a qualifying disability, and when engaging in the interactive process to determine if a reasonable accommodation is available. Both FEHA and the federal Americans with Disabilities Act recognize that the interactive process may require several meetings with the employee in order for an employer to satisfy its obligations under the law.

For more on information on Higgins-Williams and its implications on leaves and disability accommodations, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Darren C. Kameya
Partner
Los Angeles Office
dkameya@lozanosmith.com

Gabriela D. Flowers
Associate
Sacramento Office
gflowers@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

California Court of Appeal Holds Attorney-Client Privilege Not Waived by Public Agency’s Accidental Disclosure of Privileged Communications in Response to a Public Records Act Request

August 2015
Number 42

In a decision impacting public agencies across the state, the California Court of Appeal held that a school district did not waive its attorney-client privilege when it accidentally revealed attorney-client communications in response to a request under the Public Records Act. In Newark Unified School District v. Superior Court (July 31, 2015) 2015 Cal.App.Lexis 671 (Newark), the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court, which previously ruled that the school district waived the privilege even upon a mistaken release of documents. Lozano Smith’s litigation team represented the school district in the case before the trial court and on appeal.

The controversy centered on a Public Records Act statute, Government Code section 6254.5, which states “whenever a state or local agency discloses a public record which is otherwise exempt . . . to any member of the public, this disclosure shall constitute a waiver of the exemptions specified in” Government Code section 6254. Among the exemptions under Government Code section 6254 are “[r]ecords, the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law, including, but not limited to, provisions of the Evidence Code relating to privilege.” (Gov. Code, § 6254, subd. (k).) The Newark court held that regardless of Government Code section 6254.5, when a public entity mistakenly turns over attorney-client communications in response to a Public Records Act request, that is not a “disclosure” of attorney-client communications resulting in the waiver of the attorney-client privilege.

In Newark, just hours after the release of over 1,500 documents in response to a Public Records Act request, the district realized that the disclosed documents included over 100 pages of privileged communications between the district and its lawyers, and requested their return or destruction. The requesting party refused, prompting the district to seek a restraining order in superior court on the basis that the attorney-client privilege is not waived under the Public Records Act when such privileged communications are inadvertent or unintentional. The requesting party argued that any disclosure, accidental or not, resulted in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The trial court ruled against the district, but issued a restraining order against the requesting party and others prohibiting the review and dissemination of the privileged documents until any further ruling on appeal.

In reversing the trial court, the appellate court found the statutory language susceptible to the interpretations encouraged by each of the parties and, therefore, analyzed the legislative history of Government Code section 6254.5 to determine its meaning and intent. Based upon the legislative history, the court concluded that the Legislature did not intend Government Code section 6254.5 to undermine the attorney-client privilege, but rather “to prevent government officials from manipulating the [Public Record Act] exemptions by asserting them against some members of the public while waiving them as to others.” Section 6254.5 thus does not address a public agency’s employee’s accidental release of information protected by the attorney-client privilege. Furthermore, the proper interpretation of section 6254.5 required the court to reconcile it with Evidence Code section 912, which defines how the attorney-client privilege can be waived. Because inadvertent disclosures do not waive the attorney-client privilege under Evidence Code section 912, and Government Code section 6254.5 could be interpreted to avoid such a conflict with the evidence code, Newark concluded the school district did not waive the attorney-client privilege when it responded to the request under the Public Records Act.

The court did caution, however, that a member of the public could prove the distribution of privileged documents was so widespread that a court order to return the documents would be hard to enforce. The court specified that trial courts would have to a make a determination on a case-by-case basis, but that under the facts in Newark, there was no evidence of such a wide and irretrievable distribution and the school district employee quickly put the requesting party on notice of the accidental disclosure of privileged documents and demanded their return. This “Newark notice” appears a necessary step by public agencies seeking a court order to return privileged documents disclosed by mistake.

The issuance of Newark by the Court of Appeal’s First Appellate District comes as the California Supreme Court takes up Ardon v. Los Angeles, an earlier opinion by the Second Appellate District, which held that the city had surrendered its attorney-client privilege when it inadvertently disclosed attorney-client information under the Public Records Act. Ardon was de-published pending a decision by the California Supreme Court. Notably, in Ardon, the party requesting documents under the Public Records Act put the public agency on notice of the apparent disclosure of attorney-client communications and the public agency did not request the communications’ return or destruction until several months after the documents had been disclosed. Because of the Supreme Court’s consideration of Ardon, Supreme Court review may also be sought by the losing party in Newark.

The district’s litigation team in Newark included Lozano Smith Partners Jerome Behrens and Sloan Simmons, Senior Counsel Steve Ngo and Matthew Hicks, and Associate Frances Valdez.

If your public agency has any questions regarding the Newark opinion or the Public Records Act in general, please contact one of our nine offices located statewide. You can also visit our website, follow us on Facebook or Twitter, or download our Client News Brief App.

Written By

Sloan R. Simmons
Partner
Sacramento Office
ssimmons@lozanosmith.com

Steve Ngo
Senior Counsel
Walnut Creek Office
sngo@lozanosmith.com

©2015 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.