Know Your Role, Know Your Risk

June 2019
Number 28

A Civic Center Act provision that allocates liability between a school district and the users of school facilities means what it says, according to a recent decision by the California Court of Appeal. In Grossman v. Santa Monica-Malibu Unified School District, the court found the district was not liable for injuries suffered by a parent-attendee at a carnival held by a booster group at one of the district’s schools. The court also highlighted the statute’s intent that school districts and users of school facilities bear their own costs in insuring against risk and liability resulting from use of those facilities.

Facilities Use and Liability Under the Civic Center Act

Education Code section 38130 et seq., also known as the Civic Center Act, requires school districts to allow community groups to use district-owned facilities under certain conditions and allocates liability between the school district and the user of those facilities. Under Education Code section 38134(i)(1), “an entity using school facilities or grounds . . . is liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of that entity during the use of the school facilities or grounds,” while a school district “is liable for an injury resulting from the negligence of the school district in the ownership and maintenance of the school facilities or grounds.” The same section also requires school districts and users to “each bear the cost of insuring against its respective risks,” as well as the cost of defense for “claims arising from those risks.”

A school district’s liability for “ownership and maintenance” of its facilities and grounds only arises when the district would be liable under Government Code section 835 for “a dangerous condition of public property.” That form of liability arises from (1) negligent acts of a school district employee, or (2) notice of the dangerous condition with time to mitigate the danger.

The Grossman Case

In Grossman, the school district approved a booster group’s plans for a carnival on school grounds, but did not otherwise involve itself in the planning, set up, or oversight of the carnival. At the event, the plaintiff, a carnival attendee, was injured when an inflatable slide collapsed and he fell over 20 feet onto the concrete below. Similar slides were used at prior carnivals without incident.

The plaintiff sued the district, the booster group, and party rental and event companies for negligence. The plaintiff alleged that the slide was improperly set up, and was not secured to the ground with stakes. The plaintiff further alleged that the district did not inspect the slide or make sure that the operators properly assembled the slide.

The court ruled that the negligent set-up and operation of the inflatable slide, rather than any dangerous condition of the district’s property, was the cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The slide was not a condition of the school grounds because it was a temporary feature that was removed after the event. Moreover, the district did not have notice of any purported dangerous condition because similar slides had been used at the booster group’s carnival in prior years without incident, and no complaints were made about the slide being improperly set up before the incident. Because the plaintiff’s claim was based on negligent set-up and operation of the slide, and not on a dangerous condition of the property, the court held that the district could not be liable for negligence under the Civic Center Act.

In its ruling, the court discussed the legislative history of the Civic Center Act’s liability apportionment statute. In particular, the court noted objections by booster groups and similar organizations to substantial insurance coverage and indemnification obligations required by school districts for use of facilities under the Civic Center Act. The legislation provided that such costs were considered costs of maintenance and management that should be borne by the property owner, rather than the user, however, the legislative history underscored the Legislature’s intent that the Civic Center Act not broaden a school district’s liability beyond that narrow scope. The court emphasizes that the liability apportionment statute requires each party bear its own costs associated with protecting against liability.

Takeaways

The Grossman case serves as a good reminder that liability is apportioned based on a school district or user’s respective role, as are the costs to protect against that liability, and while a school district cannot shift its statutory liability to facility users, it also cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from the user’s negligence, even if the incident occurred on school grounds.

For additional information regarding the Civic Center Act or facilities use and liability, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Claudia P. Weaver

Partner

Wesley L. Carlson

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

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Letter Saves City From Potential Brown Act Violations

June 2019
Number 27

Sometimes public entities stumble despite their best efforts to dutifully comply with the Brown Act. Fortunately, the Brown Act allows these entities to fix certain violations by identifying the problem and promising never to do it again.

Public entities faced with allegations of Brown Act violations can look to TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato as a guide to avoid ensuing litigation.

TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato

In TransparentGov Novato, a group of city residents filed a lawsuit against the City of Novato. Before filing suit, the group had sent a letter to the City alleging a Brown Act violation after councilmembers discussed a controversial project which was not on the agenda, and subsequently voted to establish a subcommittee to consider the project at a future meeting. In a responding letter, the City promised that going forward it would only create subcommittees if the item is on an agenda. The City also amended its own policy manual requiring all requests for future agenda items to be in writing. TransparentGov Novato filed suit after the City issued the letter and amended its policy.

In affirming the trial court’s decision in favor of the City, the Court of Appeal found that the underlying basis for the lawsuit had been resolved because the City had amended its policy and “provided an ‘unconditional commitment to cease, desist from, and not repeat the [allegedly wrongful] past action.'” The court was persuaded by the unequivocal nature of the City’s new policy to support its conclusion that there was “no reasonable basis to believe that [the] past action would be repeated.” The court acknowledged that while policy changes do not automatically invalidate pending Brown Act litigation, the policy change in this case was adopted before TransparentGov Novato filed suit. The timing of the adoption convinced the court that it was less likely that the City would repeat the alleged violation. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and awarded the City of Novato its costs on appeal.

Takeaways

The TransparentGov Novato case emphasizes the fact that the Brown Act requires courts to dismiss lawsuits alleging Brown Act violations when public entities provide an “unconditional commitment” to stop and not repeat the allegedly wrongful past action. (Gov. Code, § 54960.2, subds. (c)(1) & (3).) A letter by itself does not necessarily guarantee that a court will determine that the public entity provided an “unconditional commitment.” Actions speak louder than words, and courts will take the public entity’s other actions into consideration before making a determination.

Public entities already facing viable allegations of Brown Act violations may want to consider adopting or changing their policies in a manner that unequivocally negates the prospect that the alleged violation will reoccur. If the public entity determines that a particular allegation is viable and decides to amend or adopt its policy, it should do so before a lawsuit is filed, if possible.

If you have any questions about TransparentGov Novato v. City of Novato, or the Brown Act in general, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Manuel F. Martinez

Partner

Tina C. Mirzazadeh

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

“Limited Due Process” Appropriate For Subcontractor Substitution Hearings

June 2019
Number 26

The California Court of Appeal recently outlined an appropriate level of due process required for a subcontractor substitution hearing. In JMS Air Conditioning and Appliance Service, Inc. v. Santa Monica Community College District (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 945, the court found that the hearing process used by the Santa Monica Community College District (College) provided the “limited due process” required for a substitution hearing. The JMS AirConditioning decision provides guidance for school districts, community colleges and cities as to how to conduct these hearings.

Subcontractor Substitution Procedure

The Subletting and Subcontracting Fair Practices Act (Pub. Contract Code, § 4100 et seq.) (Subcontracting Act) identifies the reasons why a contractor may substitute one subcontractor for another, and prescribes the process for the substitution, including a detailed notice procedure that states if the subcontractor files written objections, the awarding authority must hold a hearing and give the subcontractor at least five days’ notice of the hearing. However, the Subcontracting Act does not provide any specific procedures or standards for conducting the hearing.JMS Air Conditioning focused on what was required for conducting the substitution hearing and provides useful guidance for a valid hearing.

Limited Due Process

JMS Air Conditioning held that only “limited due process” is required for a substitution hearing. The court reasoned that, because the Subcontracting Act created only limited rights for the subcontractor, a lesser degree of due process protections are needed compared to other proceedings. The formalities of a trial are not required and the substitution hearing is “informal [in] nature, narrow [in] scope.” This can be contrasted with, for example, a public employee dismissal hearing where a higher degree of due process is required to protect the public employee’s fundamental right to employment. In this regard, the court stated that the College “is an educational institution, and the primary purpose of its governing board is thus to educate-not to referee construction disputes.”

The College’s Hearing Process

The characteristics of the College’s substitution hearing included the following:

Neutral Hearing Officer. The hearing was conducted by the College’s facilities manager, who was “generally knowledgeable about the project.” The subcontractor argued that instead the hearing should have been conducted by the college’s governing board. The court found that the Subcontracting Act did not require the governing board to conduct the hearing itself, noting that it would be an inefficient allocation of public resources and that the governing board “does not necessarily have any background in construction.” The subcontractor had the opportunity to present its case to a neutral decision maker, which the court found to be sufficient.

Advanced Notice of Grounds for Substitution. The subcontractor received a detailed description of the reasons for the substitution request prior to the substitution hearing. Written position statements (discussed below) were also submitted before the hearing. This permitted the subcontractor to prepare and respond to the general contractor’s allegations and legal arguments at the hearing.

Presenting Written Evidence and Argument. Both the general contractor and subcontractor were permitted to submit written statements detailing their positions. No page limits were set on these statements and no limits were placed on the number of exhibits or written witness statements the parties could submit. The subcontractor had an unlimited opportunity to present documents, written witness statements and argument. Witness statements were not sworn, but were accepted by the hearing officer.

Examining Witnesses. The subcontractor had the opportunity to present in-person witnesses and oral argument at the hearing. The witnesses were not examined under oath. Cross-examination of witnesses was not permitted, but the court found this did not deprive the subcontractor of due process.

Length of Hearing. The hearing officer limited the length of the hearing to two hours. The parties were advised of this in advance. The court held that “[n]othing in [the Subcontracting Act] requires a hearing of a particular length or the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses.”

Conclusion

The court found these characteristics of the College’s hearing process satisfied the due process requirements of the Subcontracting Act. Fundamentally, due process requires affording the subcontractor an opportunity to “meaningfully defend itself.” The court held that the College’s hearing afforded the subcontractor that opportunity.

Takeaways

The Subcontracting Act requires only “limited due process” for substitution hearings. The College’s hearing in JMS Air Conditioning satisfied that requirement and can be used as an example for other public entity’s substitution hearings. Though not an issue considered by this court, best practices generally also include presenting a hearing officer’s decision to the governing board for approval of the substitution decision. This case was followed by another subcontractor substitution case that also strengthened a public entity’s rights regarding substitution. (See 2019 Client News Brief No. 25.)

If you would like more information about this case or have any questions related to public works projects generally, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Ruth E. Mendyk

Partner

Wesley L. Carlson

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

Appellate Court Concludes That Public Entities May Initiate Substitution Of A Subcontractor

June 2019
Number 25

In Synergy Project Management, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, certified for publication on March 14, 2019, the California Court of Appeal concluded that awarding agencies, like prime contractors, have the power to request substitution of a subcontractor under Public Contract Code section 4107 (hereafter referred to as Section 4107).

Background

The City and County of San Francisco (City) had awarded a contract to Ghilotti Bros., Inc. (Ghilotti) for a major renovation of Haight Street. Ghilotti had listed Synergy Project Management, Inc. (Synergy) as the subcontractor for excavation and utilities work. Unfortunately, during the project, Synergy broke five gas lines and engaged in numerous other unsafe practices. As a result, the City, pursuant to Section 4107 and a specific provision in the construction contract, directed Ghilotti to remove Synergy from the project and substitute a new subcontractor to perform the remaining excavation and utilities work.

Under protest, Ghilotti removed Synergy from the project and proposed two potential replacement contractors. Synergy objected to its replacement and a hearing was held pursuant to Section 4107. At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer determined that Synergy’s unsafe practices rendered its work “substantially unsatisfactory and not in substantial accordance with the plans and specifications,” which established a ground for substitution. Synergy and Ghilotti challenged this determination at the trial court, arguing that the hearing officer’s determination was invalid because Section 4107 does not authorize an owner to remove a subcontractor, except upon a request initiated by the prime contractor. The trial court agreed based on the plain language of Section 4107, and the City filed an appeal.

The Court’s Decision

The Court of Appeal disagreed with the trial court and concluded that while Section 4107 “contemplates that the prime contractor will normally be the party to seek substitution, the procedure followed [in this case] ‘complied in substance with every reasonable objective of the statute. [citation omitted.]'” The court reasoned that the intent of the larger statutory framework encompassing Section 4107, the Subletting and Subcontracting Fair Practices Act (the Act), was intended to prevent “bid shopping” and “bid peddling” after the award of a public contract. The court acknowledged that the Act afforded subcontractors certain rights, such as Section 4107, which ensures the listed subcontractor is permitted to perform the subcontract, unless statutory grounds exist for valid substitution.

However, the court also noted that the Act gives owners the power to investigate and approve any subcontractor whether proposed in the original bid or as a substitute. Here, the court concluded there was no risk of bid shopping or bid peddling because the substitution was related to Synergy’s substandard performance of the work, which serves as a valid ground for substitution. Therefore, the City was within its investigatory power to seek substitution and had not violated the rights of Synergy under the Act.

Takeaways

In light of this decision, public agencies can now consider initiating the substitution process for a subcontractor on a public works project, as long as a valid ground for substitution exists under Section 4107. This is the second subcontractor substitution case in the last few months that strengthens a public entity’s rights regarding substitution. (See 2019 Client News Brief No. 26.)

If you would like more information about this case or have any questions related to public works projects generally, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Arne B. Sandberg

Partner

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

First Published Case On Issues Raised By SB 1421, Which Requires The Disclosure Of Certain Police Records

May 2019
Number 24

The California Court of Appeal for the First Appellate District recently handed down a decision denying Walnut Creek Police Officers’ Association’s request to stay the enforcement of a February 2019 Superior Court ruling which allowed for the release police records pursuant to Senate Bill (SB) 1421. SB 1421 went into effect on January 1, 2019, amending portions of Penal Code section 832.7 to allow for the disclosure of certain police misconduct records and records related to specific incidents, complaints, and investigations. (See 2018 Client News Brief No. 60.)

One of the issues addressed in Walnut Creek Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Walnut Creek is the question of whether records created prior to the new SB 1421 were subject to disclosure due to the lack of “retroactive language” in the new law. The appellate court’s decision made it clear that records created prior to January 1, 2019, are subject to disclosure under SB 1421 if the request for the records was made after January 1, 2019.

Takeaways

Public Agencies with peace officer employees need to be cognizant that the decision inWalnut Creek Police Officers’ Assn. v. City of Walnut Creek establishes that certain law enforcement records which were previously confidential are now subject to public disclosure, even if they were created before 2019.

This premise is furthered by the May 17, 2019 press release by California Attorney General, Xavier Becerra, stating that the California Department of Justice will begin producing documents pre-dating January 1, 2019, pursuant to SB 1421. This statement was released following a tentative ruling in San Francisco Superior Court case First Amendment Coalition v. Becerra , which also dealt with the SB 1421 disclosure issue.

For more information about SB 1421, the potential issues raised by this new law or about the California Public Records Act in general, please contact the author of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Jenell Van Bindsbergen

Partner

Matthew M. Lear

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

New Guidance Answers Questions Regarding FERPA And School Law Enforcement Units

May 2019
Number 23

The United States Department of Education (Department) issued answers to 37 Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) regarding the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). The FAQs focus on how FERPA relates to school law enforcement units and school resource officers (SROs). The full document, issued by the Department on February 12, 2019, is available here.

The Department issued the FAQs in response to the Final Report of the Federal Commission on School Safety (Report), which was completed in December 2018. The Report stated that “[e]ducators, parents, law enforcement officers, and others are often unclear about FERPA’s specific requirements and exceptions,” and “substantial misunderstanding remains at the local level among officials and educators concerning the privacy law, and in particular its application to school-based threats.” One common misconception identified by the Report is the degree to which FERPA impedes the sharing of private student information with law enforcement. The FAQs, therefore, outline the several exceptions to FERPA that may apply in the context of sharing information with law enforcement. It is important to note that these FAQs do not create any new law, they simply clarify existing law. Some key takeaways from the FAQs are outlined below.

The “School Official” Exception

One exception to the general rule against disclosing personally identifiable information (PII) without parental consent is disclosing information to a school official with a “legitimate educational interest.” The FAQs clarify that law enforcement officers-even those that are not employed by the school district-may fall under the school official category if they:

  1. Perform an institutional service or function for which the school or district would otherwise use employees (e.g., to ensure school safety);
  2. Are under the “direct control” of the school or district with respect to the use and maintenance of the education records (e.g., through a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that establishes data use restrictions and data protection requirements);
  3. Are subject to FERPA’s use and re-disclosure requirements, which provide that the PII from education records may be used only for the purposes for which the disclosure was made (e.g., to promote school safety and the physical security of students), and which limits the re-disclosure of PII from education records; and
  4. Meet the criteria specified in the school or district’s annual notification of FERPA rights for being school officials with legitimate educational interests in the education records.

The FAQs advise developing MOUs between school districts and law enforcement entities to explicitly address these four elements. Such MOUs can establish law enforcement officers as school officials to whom schools can disclose PII to in certain situations, such as when disclosure is necessary to protect students at the school.

The FAQs also explicitly warn that SROs are not automatically considered school officials under FERPA. SROs, like any other law enforcement officer, must meet the four requirements outlined above to be considered a school official to whom disclosure of PII is legal. The FAQs, in particular, emphasize the third requirement regarding re-disclosure. SROs may not re-disclose information from education records to others, including other employees of the local police department who are not acting as school officials, unless: (1) the re-disclosure is on behalf of the educational agency or institution; (2) the re-disclosure fits within one of the exceptions to FERPA’s consent requirement; and (3) the recordkeeping requirements in 34 CFR § 99.32 have been met.

The FAQs also state that a member of a threat assessment team (such as a mental health therapist) who is a not a school district employee may also fall under the “school official” exception to FERPA if the four conditions discussed above are met. The FAQs suggest-but recognize that FERPA does not require-having members of a threat assessment team sign an acknowledgement of their responsibilities for safeguarding student information under FERPA.

The “Law Enforcement Unit Record” Exception

The FAQs also remind school administrators that, under the federal regulations implementing FERPA, records that are created and maintained by a law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose are not education records. Therefore, investigative reports and other law enforcement records “may be released subject to school policy, State law, and other applicable laws.” However, a law enforcement record that is provided to a school may become an education record subject to FERPA.

The “Health or Safety Emergency” Exception

Another exception to FERPA’s general rule against disclosure of PII without parental consent discussed by the FAQs is the “health or safety emergency” exception, under which districts may disclose education records absent parental consent to protect the health or safety of the student or others. The FAQs clarify that this exception “is limited to the period of the emergency and does not allow for a blanket release of PII from a student’s education records.” Disclosures under the emergency exception must be related to a significant and articulable threat. The FAQs state that “articulable and significant threat” is a “flexible standard” in which deference is given to school officials. Despite such deference, school officials must be able to articulate what the threat is and why the disclosure is necessary.

The FAQs also emphasize that the health and safety emergency exception permits disclosure of education records only to a party whose knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other persons. The FAQs explain that such parties typically include local or State law enforcement officials, public health officials, trained medical personnel, and parents.

Takeaways

The Department issued these FAQs to clarify misconceptions about FERPA and the limitations it places on the exchange of information between law enforcement and school districts. Districts can use these FAQs as a guide in developing MOUs with law enforcement and analyzing when exchanging information with law enforcement is appropriate and legal. Districts should also note the FAQs’ emphasis on the limited application of the “health and safety emergency” exception and on the fact the law enforcement officials who are considered “school officials” cannot, in general, re-disclose information from education records to their law enforcement colleagues who do not meet the “school official” criteria.

To learn more about laws applicable to law enforcement officials and agencies working in schools, tune in to the Lozano Smith Podcast Episode 14 – Police in Schools: The Role of a School Resource Officer.

For more information about the FAQs, FERPA, or student matters generally, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Edward J. Sklar

Partner

Alyssa R. Bivins

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.

California Recognizes “Nonbinary” Gender Category And Requires Certain State Agencies To Collect Sexual Orientation And Gender Identity Data

April 2019
Number 22

The California Legislature recently passed legislation, taking effect in 2018 and 2019, making it easier for individuals to change their gender identity on official documents, adding a new gender identity option to certain forms of identification and vital records, and requiring certain state and local agencies to change data collection practices so that gender identity is more accurately accounted for in demographic data.

Assembly Bill (AB) 677: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Data Collection

Current law requires specific state departments, in the course of collecting certain demographic data, to collect voluntary self-identification information pertaining to sexual orientation and gender identity. AB 677 expands the list of state entities that must comply with these data collection requirements to include, among others, the California Department of Education (CDE). CDE must comply with the requirements as early as possible, but not later than July 1, 2019.

Additionally, AB 677 prohibits public schools administering a voluntary survey from removing any question pertaining to sexual orientation and/or gender identity. This prohibition became effective January 1, 2018. Under prior law, public schools were permitted to remove any question regarding sexual orientation and/or gender identity from voluntary surveys.

Senate Bill (SB) 179: Male, Female and Nonbinary Gender Markers

SB 179, also known as the Gender Recognition Act, was signed into law by Governor Jerry Brown and went into full effect on January 1, 2019. (See 2018 CNB No. 13.) Now, for the first time in state history, California legally recognizes a third gender option for individuals who do not identify as either male or female. Specifically, California residents may choose from three equally recognized gender options – female, male, or nonbinary – on birth certificates, driver’s licenses, and other state-issued identification cards.

Additionally, the law eliminates previous barriers for individuals wanting to change their gender marker and name on these identifying documents. Under prior law, an individual was required to obtain a physician’s declaration confirming that the individual had undergone clinically appropriate treatment for the purpose of gender transition in order to obtain a new birth certificate or to petition for a court order confirming the individual’s name and gender identity. With the passage of the Gender Recognition Act, a physician’s declaration is no longer required. Instead, individuals seeking a new birth certificate or court order confirming their name and gender identity may submit an affidavit attesting, under penalty of perjury, that the request for a change of gender is to conform to their gender identity and not for any fraudulent purpose. Minors may also petition the court for an order confirming gender identity with the support of a parent or legal guardian.

The law does not affect documents issued by other states or the federal government, such as Social Security cards, passports, and documents issued by US Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Takeaways

School districts, community colleges, and other public agencies will need to review and potentially revise forms, documents, and policies to ensure compliance with the Gender Recognition Act.

For additional information regarding AB 677 and SB 176 or to discuss student rights and gender issues generally, please contact the authors of this Client News Brief or an attorney at one of our eight offices located statewide. You can also subscribe to our podcast, follow us on Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn or download our mobile app.

Written by:

Gabriela D. Flowers

Partner

Courtney de Groof

Associate

©2019 Lozano Smith

As the information contained herein is necessarily general, its application to a particular set of facts and circumstances may vary. For this reason, this News Brief does not constitute legal advice. We recommend that you consult with your counsel prior to acting on the information contained herein.